Newletter 7: Modifying the Westphalian Model

This week I am dedicating the whole newsletter to one of the biggest problems in Western civilization that nobody talks about.  That is, specifically, the inability of the Westphalian model to accommodate the current rapid increase in cultural fragmentation and the political fallout that is resulting from it.  Despite the Rightish and Leftish coverage, it is the underlying problem in Ukraine right now.  However, it is also a problem in other places and it is one that will become worse as the forces of social change accelerate over the next few decades.

At its core, the problem is that the Westphalian model results in an extremely illiberal stance within the community of nations with regard to secession.  That would not be a problem if modern society was culturally homogenous.  However, even within a liberal, democratic ideological world view, there is a whole lot of room for disagreement.  Additionally, ethnic, national and/or group identity, within EUNA, is potentially very diverse.  The development of the Internet, through print and video news and entertainment content, is allowing these groups to find each other and reinforce their sense of identity.  Also, the formation of cultural or ethnic identity is not geographically defined.  There have been several diasporas that now can remain cohesive rather than being assimilated into their local community.  

I often speak about the Right Silo and the Left Silo.  Very little information or ideas move from one Silo to the other.  Consequently, they each are mechanisms that are reinforcing and magnifying several, clustered cultural identities.  The Left Silo is comprised of Socialists, Marxist/Feminists, Greens, (for now) Traditional Christian Democrats,  etc.  The Right Silo is comprised of Christian Conservatives, Opportunity Conservatives, Libertarians, etc.  Even this is an oversimplification.  However, there are also groups, including Polymathica, that cannot comfortably fit into either of these two dominant Silos.  Consequently, over time, more Silos will form in order to accommodate them.

Regional and ethnic identities are compounding the problem, especially in Europe.  However, in North America, the West Coast and the South are developing Regional identities with very different, probably incompatible, ideological viewpoints.  They still are part of the, Enlightenment, European culture, but likely too different to comfortably share a common body of laws, policies and programs.

By way of background, between 1642 and 1648 much of Europe undertook six years of negotiations that resulted in major treaties, referred to as the Peace of Westphalia.  It instituted several changes in how the European community of nations interacted with one another.  The part that, over time, revolutionized the global community of nations, and changed the future, was the introduction of the concept of sovereignty.  Essentially, it was the birth of the concept of territorial integrity and the modern nation state.

The Peace of Westphalia took place prior to the emergence of the Political Philosophy of the Enlightenment.  Hobbes is generally credited with its beginning when he  wrote Leviathan in 1651. However, it was more than a century later that the primary principles were fully formulated by Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Smith, Kant, et alia.  Consequently, the drafting of the Peace of Westphalia was not fully informed by the Enlightenment and it is not fully compatible with it.

During and immediately after the Enlightenment, nearly all nation states in Europe became liberal democracies.  Many retained their Monarchies but in a ceremonial role.  This means that there is a pronouncement in some form that the individual enjoys liberty, despite the sovereignty of the nation state.  The 1789 "Declaration of the Rights of Man", approved by the National Assembly of France carefully delineated the Rights that accrue to the citizens of a liberal democracy based upon these Enlightenment principles.  A critical point of the document was, "4. Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights."  This presaged the concepts of Kant's 1797 Categorical Imperative, which in some ways, completed the Political Philosophy portion of the Enlightenment.

On the other hand, the previous item, "3. The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation." precludes sovereignty claimed and exercised by aggregations of citizens unless they constitute a majority within the whole nation state.  It is unlikely that the framers intended it to be interpreted in an illiberal way, but that is precisely what happened in practice.

The ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America in 1791, through its Bill of Rights, enumerated many of the same principles codified by the French "Declaration of the Rights of Man".  The Bill of Rights confers to States a degree of Sovereignty.  However, it is subordinate to the Sovereignty of the Federal government.  The U.S. has a benefit in that a number of States did secede and, when they did so, made several arguments that doing so was legal and, even, just.   However, these arguments did not persuade the Federal government and a war of reintegration ensued.  For many, this firmly established the principle that communities within a nation state are irrevocably subject to the ultimate sovereignty of the nation.  

Again, this could be construed as oppression, as Thomas Jefferson asserted, when he penned in the Declaration of Independence, "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."

Locke, especially, argued that the rights of the individual are natural and, as such irrevocable  One of those rights, expressly enumerated, was liberty.  Yet, the claim that the nation state possesses ultimate dominion over its citizens clearly violates the natural right of liberty.  This contradiction remains unresolved and, even today, as demonstrated in Yugoslavia, Crimea, Donbas, South Ossetia, Transnistria, North Cyprus, Catalonia, etc. the declared desire on the part of a community to sever ties with the nation state within which it finds itself nearly always, as it did with the North American colonies,  leads to violence.  

Several Enlightenment Philosophers, most notably Jean Jacques Rousseau, argued that the legitimacy of the nation state was based upon a social contract with its citizens.  While attractive as a concept, the Social Contract concept has several very serious flaws.  In nearly all cases, current residents did not agree to the Social Contract, but rather were simply born into it.  Generally, they are allowed to leave if they did not agree with the terms of the Social Contract (It is generally considered illiberal when countries establish 'exit visas'), however, the rights of citizenship are considered to be non-severable and are forfeited with expatriation. 

Additionally, current boundaries of nation states are a legacy to all current citizens.  Long ago in various events, groups of people met and drew perimeters around large parcels of land and called them countries.  With the Peace of Westphalia, the perimeters were memorialized and thereafter nation states became the center of focus of geopolitical interactions.  There is no mechanism by which they can be changed.  It is definitely not the case that the territorial integrity of nations were never again challenged.  Wars still happened and when they ended, often the borders of nations changed.  However, the community of nations, in aggregate, generally condemned these wars of conquest.

 
Today, almost no nation state grants the right of portions of their population to withdraw and to claim sovereignty for themselves.  This is despite the current borders often being arbitrary and even nonsensical.  For example, after attempting secession in 2017, Catalonia found its action declared illegal by Spain's Constitutional Court and an arrest warrant for sedition was declared against the former Catalonian President.  This was done on the basis of the very historically recent 1978 Spanish Constitution.  Catalonia's identity is quite ancient.

Their history began its formal regional recognition as part of the Roman Empire after a period when it was occupied by an indigenous population with a few Greek colonies.  When Rome fell, it had a brief period of indeterminate status and then, in 718, became part of the Umayyad dynasty.  Around 800 A.D. it fell under Frankish rule.  In 1137, much of it became part of Aragon, with the remainder becoming the Principality of Catalonia.  In 1469, through marriage, Castille and Aragon partially merged under the marriage of Ferdinand II (of Aragon) and Isabella I (of Castille).  However, it was not until 1714 under Philip V of Bourbon that Spain came under common rule, which included the modern Catalonia.  This, then, becomes the point in time when Catalonia became part of Spain, in a meaningful way.  Even then, however, with the Napoleonic wars, the continuity of Catalonia as part of Spain was interrupted.

The current nation of Spain was established in 1978 and it is under that Constitution that Spain's Constitutional Court declared the the 2017 referendum for Catalonian independence illegal.  The referendum was held anyway and the independence side won.  The Spanish central government declared the referendum invalid and arrested many of the organizers, while others fled the country.  The Spanish Senate called for direct rule of Catalonia and a new election was held in which, again, pro-independence parties took control of the legislature.  However, in 2019, finally, calmer heads prevailed and a 'table of negotiations' was instituted.  However, the Federal government, before it started announced that it would not consider Catalonian independence.  So, with a pro-independence Catalonian Legislature and an obdurate central government, this disagreement is clearly not over.

This situation where the majority of Spain is against Catalonian independence, while the small majority of Catalonia is in favor, is being repeated over Europe.  Clearly, this is a tyranny of the majority.  We see it in Ukraine, where the majority of Ukrainians were against Crimean independence, but the vast majority of Crimeans were in favor.  Transnistria is in favor of independence, but the majority of Moldovans are against it.  The northern portion of Cyprus is Turkish and wants independence, while the majority of Cypriots are against it.

In these and many other cases, the Westphalian model is counterproductive and, many times, promotes illiberal treatment of minority groups of citizens.  The Kurds, comprising minority populations in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran have never had a homeland and the currrent interpretation of the Westphalian model, never will.  In the worst cases, as in the current Ukrainian situation, substantial military conflicts arise.  Even in the best of situations, 'break away' regions, such as Kosovo are caught in a state of limbo.  Serbia considers it to be part of Serbia, while Kosovo, primarily ethnic Abanians, considers itself to be independent.  They have their own money, their own license plates, their own border control, but they are not recognized by about half of the UN members and are not a UN member, themselves.  Northern Cyprus is in a worse situation with de facto independence, but recognized only by Turkey.  Turkey maintains a substantial military presence there to dissuade Cyprus and/or NATO of engaging in a military intervention.

The above mentioned cases are examples where there is little controversy over whether the majority of the people within the region favor independence.  However, a very substantial minority (>40%) do.  Such has been the situation in Quebec, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Donbas (perhaps), to name a few.  While imposing laws, programs and policies that the regional majority accept but a minority profoundly disagrees with is also illiberal.  Resolution is even more problematic.

I am writing a book entitled, 'A New Enlightenment: Political Philosophy in the Information Age'.  In it I propose a new principle of liberalism, specifically, 'No person should be required to live under a body of laws, programs and policies that (s)he considers to be fundamentally unjust'.  This does not mean that every difference of opinion should invoke this principle.  There is plenty of room for political resolutions.  However, this does not apply to significant differences in principles.

Politics is the art of compromise.  It is wrong to compromise one's principles.  Therefore, political resolutions are not proper when differences are matters of principle.  Resolutions are also not likely to be found because the opposing sides won't compromise.  This divergence of values is central to the polarization in the U.S. It will be central to the coming 'divorce'.  Nor, I argue, should they.  Enforcing 'territorial integrity' over a minority because the minority agree with it is fundamentally counter to the principles of liberalism.

Originally, Crimea was populated by Scythians but Persia rendered the peninsula more or less uninhabitable.  Over time, other populations moved in.  By 600 A.D., Crimea was ethnically a mixture of Greeks, Bulgars, Kypchaks and Goths.  However, around 900 A.D. Russians took it from the Byzantine Empire.  They held it until around 1200 A.D. when briefly Venice took it over, but lost it 30 years later to the Mongol invasion.   In 1475, it was taken over by the Ottoman Empire.  They held it until 1783 when Russia took it back.  While Russia and, later, the Soviet Union had difficulty holding it until after WWII.

During the 2014 conflict in Crimea, the news talked about what the U.S. wanted, what the national government of Ukraine wanted, what Russia, Germany and France wanted.  I kept asking, 'What to the Crimeans want?  Isn't that most important?'  What I learned was that few people could think outside of the Westphalian model.  Those stuck in it interpreted Russia as invading Ukraine.  However, those who could transcend the Westphalian model might conclude that, rather than an invasion, Russia was defending the Crimea's right to self-determination.  One might argue, as I would, that if Ukraine is allowed to defend its right to self determination, the same right should be granted to Crimea and now Donbas, as well.

 
Today, all the ethnic populations that comprise Crimea's history have disappeared through interbreeding save for the Tatars.  The Tatars came to Crimea through the Mongol invasion.  They comprise about 12% of the population of Crimea.  While Ukrainian is more of a national identity than an ethnic one, but it comprises about 15% of Crimea.  That is somewhat misleading since Pew Research found that about 88% of Crimeans favor the joining of the Russian Federation.  However, that means that 12%, presumably mostly Tatars, who do not.  

If there is an ethical justification for Crimea to withdraw from Ukraine, then that same logic will apply to any decision of the Tatars to leave the Crimean government.  We don't know that there is any appetite for such a secession.  However, that is not important with regard to their right to do so.  The problem arises when there is no clear geographic definition of the population.

Northern Ireland is an example of a minority population within a geographically defined region that did not want to belong to a larger nation state but did not define a specific geographic location within Northern Ireland.  It is a good example of an intermediate situation.  A minority of Northern Irish were Catholic and wanted Northern Ireland to reunite with Ireland.  Most Northern Irish did not and preferred to remain in the U.K.  They really had just two reasonable options.  One, they could individually move to Ireland and, in fact, that has slowly been happening.  Two, they could all move to the most Catholic portion of Northern Ireland and when they become the majority in that area, declare independence for that region and/or apply for membership in Ireland.

In most of Europe, minorities that contain separatist movements typically already have their own region or province.  This is certainly true in the Basque region of Spain and France, Scotland, Alsace in France, Bavaria in Germany, etc.  It means that if the separatist movement reaches a critical mass, the independence demands will be fairly well defined.  However, in every case, they comprise a very small minority of the nation state's population. 

While most of the separatist movements in North America are not ethnic or regional, that is beginning to change.  That is because, as the majority in a given State or Province uses the 'tyranny of the majority' to create the laws, programs and policies that they prefer, the minority leaves.  This is often just concentrating pre-existing subcultural differences.  In other words, California, for example, has been progressive and secular for quite awhile.  On the other hand, Florida has been conservative and Christian.  What is happening is that conservative and religious Californians are moving to Florida and while there is not yet evidence for it, presumably, eventually, as this process continues, progressive, secular Floridians will move to California.

At some point, one can easily imagine that California, Oregon and Washington may not want to share a country with Texas, Tennessee, Florida, etc.  However, will there be justification for the withdrawal from the Union?  We know that in 1860, there was not.  A war was fought.  However, it is now over 160 years later.  Laws, interpretations of laws and public opinions have changed.  Say that Florida seceded from the U.S.  The majority of Americans would likely be against it.  However, would they be willing to see columns of tanks roll into Tallahassee, arresting local officials and bombing pockets of resistance?  Most likely the answer is no and a situation that now prevails in Transnistria, Abkhasia, Kosovo, Northern Cyprus, etc. would result.  In other words, Florida would behave as if it was independent, the Federal government would not recognize it, but would only engage in non-violent resistance.

I am currently in-process on a book, 'The Rise of the Microstate: The geopolitics of the Information Age' in which I will explore the mechanisms by which nation states will end and subculturally defined microstates will emerge.  Here, however, we are focusing on whether nation states are on sound philosophical ground when they assert, as they almost always do, that secession is illegal.  The current interpretation of the Westphalian model, they invariably say that it is illegal.  Other countries will claim that it is an internal affair and other nations should not recognize breakaway regions until and unless the nation state involved does so. 

Enlightenment principles support the concept of individual liberty.  The issue of liberty aggregated while often addressed in scholarly communities has generally concluded that secession is a natural extension of the individual right to liberty and self-determination.  However, among legal communities, whether addressing international law or the legal status within a specific nation state the right to secession has not regularly seen as justified and when it is seen as justified, only so in extreme situations.  This is primarily the result of the canonization within the United Nations and other transnational organization of the Westphalian system.  Being of a more philosophical rather than legal perspective, I am more convinced by the former than the latter.  However, the issue is quickly becoming a more practical one than either a philosophical or legal one.

We currently have a number of 'breakaway' regions that are functioning as de facto nations.  We also have several where secession was declared but where national governments recaptured control.  Other regions, such as Northern Ireland have become peaceful but are likely to have continuing problems due to changes in demographics.  Lastly, the fragmenting and polarizing processes of the Internet will likely see increasing calls for independence.  Simply put, if each event results in a war, the 21st Century will become quite bloody.  The Westphalian model simply must be modified so that secession and the emergence of microstates is an orderly and peaceful one.  Right now, the war in Ukraine is being misapprehended as a war between Westphalian nation states when it is, in reality, about the right to secede.  It is the present one, but it is hardly the last one.